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ABSTRACT. In the current literature addressing the Foucault/Deleuze relationship, there is a 
clear tendency to either replicate and expand Foucault’s over-simplified rejection of Deleuzian 
desire as already caught in a discursive trap or play of power; or to replicate Deleuze and Guat-
tari’s over-simplified reading of Foucault’s dispositif, in which power and resistance are deemed 
opposed and thus understood via a structure of negativity. In either case, each thinker is accused 
of referring to an asocial or essentialist multiplicity, typically in the form of a real transcendence 
(positive Body), which is deemed ‘inconsistent’ with their post-structuralist yearnings. This arti-
cle argues that there is in fact a real and enduring consistency between the two thinkers, which is 
to be found in the mutual use of an ontology of ‘pure’ or ‘disjunctive’ immanence – as derived 
from and developed through Nietzsche’s method of genealogy – as a way to construe pow-
er/subjectification, with pleasure/desire taken as the affective inside of this power. That said, the 
somewhat semantic difference between desire and pleasure being proposed does lead to a slight, 
though tangible, divergence in politico-ethical and practical possibilities. This article concludes 
that it is this divergence that should from the real basis of debate. 
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INTRODUCTION 
According to Foucault “where there is desire the power relation is already present: an 
illusion, then, to denounce this relation for a repression exerted after the event; but vani-
ty as well to go questioning after a desire that is beyond the reach of power.”1 It is pre-
cisely for this reason that freedom cannot be understood as the liberation of desire, as 
the liberation of an essential self as encapsulated in desire, nor as the simple negation of 
a repressive power. Indeed, Foucault famously proposes freedom as an aesthetical prac-
                                                        
1 Michel Foucault, The Will to knowledge: The History of Sexuality: Volume One [1978] (1998), 151. 
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tice, a fluid and creative process, operating through power-relations by way of “bodies 
and pleasures.”2 Foucault avoids the language of desire precisely because it seems to 
evoke a psychoanalytic idealism of lack and repression (contra his reversal of the repres-
sion hypothesis as presented in the first volume of The History of Sexuality), and in the 
same vein some sort of discursive fiction or essentialism that ultimately leads to a nega-
tive concept of power incompatible with his relational concept. Foucault’s contempo-
rary, Gilles Deleuze, explicitly construes desire as the affective, relational and agentic 
site through which aesthetical practices and ethical (re)negotiation can be articulated. 
Despite a number of apparent ‘post-structuralist’ continuities between Foucault and 
Deleuze, this appears to present a misalliance between them on the question of affectivi-
ty and its relation to power.  
Deleuze himself comments that it is telling that Foucault is more interested in Sade, 
whereas he is more interested in Masoch.3 Allegedly, this portrays a difference that is 
certainly “more than a matter of vocabulary.”4 What is striking is the fact that the misal-
liance has received little attention from critics and sympathetic commentators alike.5 
What is also true, however, is that of the few who do directly pay attention to the appar-
ent misalliance, there is a clear tendency to either replicate Foucault’s rejection of desire 
as already caught in a discursive trap or play of power6 and his related suspicion of 
Deleuzian desire;7 or to replicate Deleuze and Guattari’s over-simplified reading of Fou-
cault’s assemblage, in which power and resistance are deemed opposed and thus under-
stood via a structure of negativity.8 
Regarding the former interpretation, thinkers such as Judith Butler and Wendy Grace 
essentially argue that by virtue of retaining desire as a primordial ‘micro’ essence or pre-
social multiplicity, Deleuze ends up viewing power as a negative force concomitant with 
the macro-level or macro-political.9 It follows from this that ethical resistance – what 
Deleuze and Guattari refer to as becoming a Body without Organs (BwO)10 – concerns 
liberating this desire from the repressive effects of the macropolitical and macropolitical 
institutions, i.e. the State. With such a reading, Deleuze is said to be led right back into 
                                                        
2 Ibid., 157.  
3 Gilles Deleuze, “Desire and Pleasure,” in Two Regimes of Madness, ed. David Lapoujade [2001] (2007), 
131. 
4 Ibid., 130. 
5 Wendy Grace, “Faux Amis: Foucault and Deleuze on Sexuality and Desire”, Critical Inquiry, 36:1, 
(2014), 54. 
6 Foucault, The Will to Knowledge, 151. 
7 Michel Foucault, “Structuralism and Post-structuralism”, in Michel Foucault: Aesthetics: Essential 
works of Foucault 1954-1984, ed.  James. D. Faubion, ed. (2000), 446. 
8 Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 585n. 39. Interest-
ingly, this reading is dropped by the time Deleuze comes to write Foucault [1986] (2006).  
9 Judith Butler, Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France [1987] (2012), 214-220; 
Wendy Grace, Faux Amis, 71-73. 
10 It is more broadly defined as the plane of immanence or the differential virtual prior to its actual-
ised expressions. It is related to ethical resistance, in that the ideal is to release the virtual from its 
captured expressions in the actual, or at least to tend to the virtual so as to effectuate new expressions.  
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the very Marxian-Freudian repression hypothesis that Foucault painstakingly dissected 
as a production of modern power itself.11 Since this vision of repression speaks to the 
political theory of old, in which power is ‘anti-energy’ and freedom the negation of this 
energy, those with poststructuralist leanings are left without any ambivalence as to who 
to favour in this debate.12  
Regarding the latter interpretation, Deleuze sympathisers, particularly Hardt and 
Negri, have replicated and expanded Deleuze and Guattari’s contention that it is in fact 
Foucault who reinstates an outmoded negativity by opposing power to resistance.13 
Broadly speaking, this reading has linked in with, and certainly reinforces the caricature 
of Foucault as an heir to Althusser, inasmuch as he is interpreted as utilising concepts 
concerned with the way in which power serves to ‘fix’ social identities through individ-
ualising practices that are both discursive and institutional. That is, to view Foucault as 
abiding by some sort of Althusserian theory of interpretation.14 This has opened the path 
for others to criticise Foucault on the grounds of incoherency, i.e. given that power is an 
omnipotent and productive force, it is unclear how resistance would take effect without 
evoking a positive Body (pleasure as an essentialism) discordant with Foucault’s ontolo-
gy.15 Other scholars have, in addition to these charges, argued that Foucault’s account of 
power lacks interiority or any substantial consideration for affectivity.16  
If ever there were an instance of two people ‘speaking past each other’, this is surely 
it. Secondary literature has continued to follow and in turn amplify this ‘speaking past 
each other’, resulting in a number of contrived and exceedingly confused exchanges and 
                                                        
11 A similar point is made by Slavoj Žižek, Bodies without Organs: On Deleuze and Consequences (2012), 
28; see also Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations (1991), 106. 
12 Butler (Subjects of Desire, 220) claims that in replacing Deleuze’s ‘precultural ontology’ of desire 
within a theory of power-knowledge, Foucault brings to light the discursive limits of Deleuze’s posi-
tion, thereby sharpening his “challenge to psychoanalysis.” 
13 Hardt and Negri, Empire (2000), 24 and 27-6. 
14 Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology (1999), 296; Judith Butler, The 
Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection (1997), 2, 5 and 99; John McCumber, Time and Philosophy: A 
History of Continental Thought (2011), 328-9; Mark Olssen, Michel Foucault: Materialism and Education 
(2006), 30; Karlis Racevskis, Michel Foucault, Rameau’s nephew and the question of identity, in James 
Bernauer and David Rasmussen (eds.) The Final Foucault (1991), 23; and Richard Wolin, The Seduction 
of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance with Fascism, from Nietzsche to Postmodernism (2004), 13. Michael 
Hard and Antonio Negri, Empire, 24. For a targeted response to these claims, see Nathan Widder, 
“Foucault and Power Revisited”, European Journal of Political Theory, 3:4, (2004), 411-432. 
15 For instance, Slajov Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, 296. Although Judith Butler (Gender Trouble: Feminism 
and the Subversion of Identity (2006), 132) appears to acknowledge that resistance is internal to Fou-
cauldian power, she argues that Foucault himself is inconsistent on this account: “Foucault wants to 
argue that there is no ‘sex’ in itself which is not produced by complex interactions of discourse and 
power, and yet there does seem to be a ‘multiplicity of pleasures’, in itself which is not the effect of 
any specific discourse/power exchange.” See also Wolin, The Seduction of Unreason, 19; and Jürgen 
Habermas, The Philosophical Discourses of Modernity (1987), 282.  
16 See for instance Nik Farrell Fox, The New Sartre: Explorations in Postmodernism (2003), 5; and Hardt 
and Negri, Empire, 28 and 422n. 14. 
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theoretical straw men.17 The conceptual truth – as in the logical consistency of the con-
ceptual framework as opposed to the transcendent Truth – as I wish to present it, could 
not be further from these readings. There is in fact a real and continuous consistency – or 
alliance – between Foucault and Deleuze; such that we can view their philosophical rela-
tionship in terms of ‘vrais amis’, as opposed to ‘faux amis’.18 The difference between 
power-knowledge (with pleasure as the favoured affective term) and Deleuze’s mi-
cropolitics (with desire as the favoured affective term), should be viewed and under-
stood as more a matter of semantics.19  
The consistency is to be found on the ontological level. Both thinkers adopt and argue 
for an ontology of ‘pure’ immanence, with particular reference to Nietzschean genealo-
gy. Ultimately, ‘pure’ immanence provokes and in turn is employed as a way to con-
strue a concept of power/subjectification as a non-essentialist and non-dialectical rela-
tion, with pleasure/desire taken as the affective inside of this power. Thus in referring to 
a ‘semantic difference’, I am referring to ontic, or rather non-ontological differences con-
cerning expressive and linguistic preference and emphasis vis-à-vis affectivity. What is 
more, it is precisely due to ‘pure’ immanence as understood by Deleuze/Foucault that 
broader questions regarding their views on ethical resistance can be readdressed and in 
turn, reconsidered. The point here is not to embark on the reconsideration itself, which 
would result in – if not verge on – a definitive though unsatisfactorily limited resolution 
(given the finitude of the present paper). The point, rather, is to provide the conceptual 
basis for such a reconsideration.  
It is evident that my reading of Deleuze and Foucault in this paper is systematic, 
viewing their overriding ontological contribution to subjectivity in terms of the ‘disjunc-
tive’ as the defining synthetic feature of ‘pure’ immanence; and thematic, in that it identi-
fies the development and exposition of this ontology as a theme present throughout 
their respective oeuvre’s. The presence of the ‘disjunctive’ is not consistent in terms of 
conceptual labelling and context, though it is consistent in terms of progressive devel-
opment, such that it is possible to provide a retrospective systematisation that links to-
gether the apparent discrepancy across their various works. And though not parallel in 
terms of pace, linear order and nature, the development of the ‘disjunctive’ can never-
theless be read as that which provides the fundamental link between Foucault and 
                                                        
17 Aside from the texts already mentioned, take for instance Mary Beth Mader, Sleights of Reason: 
Norm, Bisexuality, Development (2011), who seeks to overcome the apparent tension between Deleuzian 
desire and Foucauldian pleasure, through focusing on “normality,” and “bi-sexuality,” as points of 
union (p. 3); or Frida Beckman, Between Desire and Pleasure: a Deleuzian Theory of Sexuality (2013), 18, 
who takes the tensions highlighted as given, and from there seeks to uncover “what kind of energy is 
produced if we bring together these tensions.”  
18 As characterised by Wendy Grace, see n. 9.  
19 This would appear to vindicate Didier Eribon’s (Michel Foucault (1992), 58-62), contention that the 
rift that existed between Deleuze and Foucault in the late 1970s was more a matter of politics than 
theory or philosophy; relating, for the most part, to the Klauss Croissant affair. Foucault sought to 
defend Croissant on the particular issue of rights, compared to Deleuze’s defence of Klauss based on 
the more universal issue of revolutionary becoming. See also Steve Hendley, Reason and Relativism: A 
Sartrean Investigation (1991), 198.  
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Deleuze. It provides, in other words, a more holistic ontology20 by which to trace lines of 
convergence and thus reposition the Foucault-Deleuze encounter.  
The Fold as Disjunctive Synthesis  
At its most basic, immanence refers to a state of being internal or remaining within, in 
which the condition (e.g. God) does not transcend, but rather is in the conditioned (e.g. 
sensuous existence). Rooted in the thought of Spinoza and the ancient Stoics on the na-
ture of divinity, when applied to the formal structure of political subjectivity, it holds 
that the true cause of subjective and affective experience is in the effect, such that to iso-
late the one from the other is to enact a radical abstraction. Now, ‘to remain within’ 
might suggest some kind of harmonious unity or idealist interiority.21 What is significant 
about this ‘pure’ notion of immanence, however, is that despite superficial appearances 
it cannot be restricted to or defined in terms of ‘complete’ interiority, inclusivity or an 
apparent harmony between the conditions of experience and experience itself. ‘Pure’ 
immanence does in fact entail a notion of a socio-political Outside or Other and a corre-
sponding excess or disturbance, a pluralisation of differences greatly exceeding the rep-
resentational capacities of language and the large-scale contemporary forms of power 
that produce it. It is an Other radically reconfigured in terms of a fold of Being, as op-
posed to Hegelian holes of nothingness.  
Following Deleuze’s Foucault and The Fold,22 we can initially understand the fold in a 
literal manner, as in the folding of a piece of paper. Two marks on diagonally opposing 
corners of a piece of A4 paper may be distinguished by their negative difference, in that 
this primarily demarcates respective locations or identities. Unassuming as the point 
may seem, it is notable that the opposing marks are still of the same paper, for it is by 
virtue of this that if I were to fold one side of the paper over to the other, the two oppos-
ing marks would still retain their negative difference in one dimension, while gaining a 
closer connection in another. If this idea of folding is applied to multiple spatial dimen-
sions, as we find in non-Euclidean n-dimensional space (and even multiple temporal 
dimensions), then we can image a highly complex relation of folds as a generative and 
constitutive process, which is always immanent unto itself without reference to a trans-
cendent or external dimension. I can fold a piece of paper in multiple ways via multiple 
dimensions to generate new divergent relations between and within the marks on it. The 
folding can even serve to affect the form of the paper itself. In any case, the paper shall 
                                                        
20 ‘Holistic’ in the sense that, given their ontological similitude, Deleuzian desire and Foucauldian 
pleasure can be read together so as to provide a fuller interpretation of the human experience. 
21 Some have read immanence in this fashion, e.g. Alain Badiou, Deleuze: The Clamor of Being (2000), p. 
24 and Slavoj Žižek, Organs without Bodies: On Deleuze and Consequences, p. 25. 
22 The one monograph Deleuze dedicated to the fold (The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, [1988] (2006)) is 
in reality a monograph on Leibniz by way of the fold. Aside from a few references to the fold in his 
earlier works – (see for instance Deleuze Difference and Repetition, 76-8 and 125) – the only other occa-
sion Deleuze explicates the fold is in his monograph on Foucault. But again, rather than engaging 
with an explication of the concept of the fold itself, it is employed instead as a means by which to 
conceptualise Foucault.  
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remain. Opposition and/or correspondence between two things (such as the folded 
marks) may still exist. Yet, neither their opposition and/or correspondence are constitu-
tive or conceptually holistic, since such opposition and/or correspondence will never 
delineate the multiple/other meanings, senses or differences that exist between and 
within the two things.  
What is signified with this idea of a relational fold, then, is a “structural dissym-
metry.”23 Constitutive differences of a being (e.g. the paper) are related through their dif-
ference, establishing intersections where differences resonate and communicate with 
each other and out of which temporary unities of identity and representation – as a mo-
ment of relational synthesis of intuitive-conceptual-ideal presentations – may arise. Such 
a folded relation can equally be dubbed, and indeed is dubbed, disjunctive since the res-
onance and communication of the disparate/ heterogeneous/ singular differences is not 
reducible to an Apollonian–Dionysian dichotomy between order and chaos, the sum-
mary law of all or nothing. In this dichotomy, differences are either collapsed into a 
higher unity (dialectical synthesis) of full positivity (identity) and thus assimilated into a 
singular and same logic, or collapse into a total and ineffectual non-relation, as full nega-
tivity (nothingness).24 In a disjunctive/folded synthesis, differences – of faculties, of sig-
nifiers, or discursive nodal points, of agents – relate without their difference being sub-
sumed and thus the dichotomy is surpassed.  
Congruent with my thematic and systemised account of Foucault and Deleuze, we 
can locate three types, or levels of folding within their works. There is a transcendental 
Inside of infinitesimal folds as interiority (self/ faculties), an Outside of infinitesimal 
folds as socio-political exteriority (Other) and a fold between the two (synthesis). Or, to 
put it differently, the Outside actual multiplicity is a folded synthesis that creates an In-
side folded synthesis as in a virtual multiplicity of the infinitesimal self. The Inside in 
turn is folded back out or into the Outside, in what is a seemingly circular process of 
folding. The multiplicities form a continuum. Positing the differential fold as primary 
amounts to a reversal of Plato’s emphasis on immutable positive identities underpin-
ning a world of flux. For what we have here is a primacy of difference, of pure flux. Dif-
ference is primary, difference is affirmed, leading Deleuze to speak of ‘vice-diction’ as 
opposed to ‘contradiction’. The reversal is not a perfect one, however, because with im-
manence there is no reference to a transcendent Outside world beyond sensual material 
existence or indeed being itself. The Outside, instead, is to be understood as an internal 
one. It is, as with contemporary theories of transcendence, an Outside experienced in the 
immanent flux of our life, typically in the particularised form of an inexplicable Other. 
However, it is not an Other of formal transcendence (holes of negativity); it is an Other 
that mediates heterogeneous differences without negative rupture, which is also to say 
that the Other is the fold and the fold is the Other.  
                                                        
23 As Nathan Widder aptly puts it, “Two Routes from Hegel” in L. Tønder and L (eds.) Radical Democ-
racy: Politics Between Abundance and Lack (2005), 43. 
24 The relation is not labelled “disjunctive” until his Logic of Sense (2004). 
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Folding as a reversal of Platonism relates to the fundamental principle of ‘pure’ im-
manence as that which is concordant, too, with the fundamental principle of Deleuze’s 
‘transcendental empiricism’: the conditions of experience are derived from experience 
itself. ‘Pure’ immanence is ‘transcendental’ insofar as it concerns itself with the condi-
tions of experience, and yet still empirical insofar it concerns itself with the real to which 
it is immanent. The fold, as the internal/inside difference that mediates differences, is 
derived from our encounters with the Outside, it is the Other, to the extent that the Inside 
is merely that of its crease, i.e. it is derived from the Outside as an experience stored as a 
memory trace, a virtual force in a force relation of difference. Thus it is through the Oth-
er/Outside as an encounter that is folded into the self, and in turn folds/mediates differ-
ences, that a thing gains its meaning and sense, i.e. unfolds. One cannot be separated 
from the other. There is, then, no truly public-private distinction to be had, nor an ulti-
mate stable point of departure, nor a transcendent outside, nothing truly beyond that 
which we live in ultimate flux that can be relied on as a pre-socio-political or extra-socio-
political ground. Thus there is neither a subject – be that as a positive Body or a negative 
Being – as an external precondition of thought, meaning and action. The ‘I’ of the subject 
and the identities by which it marks itself are the temporary surface effects of folding. 
The ‘subject’ is a fold. And the affect (be it pleasure or desire) is the Inside of the fold, its 
crease, the will of the self operating in disjunction with the Outside of the self.  
Deleuze, the Will to Power and Desiring-Machines  
Regarding Deleuze, the origin of the fold as a disjunctive synthesis is found and expli-
cated in the will to power as conceptualised in his Nietzsche and Philosophy. According to 
Deleuze, the ‘will to power’ forms the crux of Nietzsche’s most general project, which is 
“the introduction of the concepts of sense and value.”25 As opposed to anthropocentric 
and essentialist ontologies, Nietzsche understands sense and value in expressivist terms. 
Nietzsche’s expressionism refers to a reversal of the tactic notion that evaluations are 
hinged on pre-given values through which a subject appraises, judges and evaluates, 
holding instead that “values presuppose evaluations,” or ‘”perspectives of appraisal,” 
from which their own value is derived.26 In this case, evaluations are not values, but ra-
ther the “differential element,” or the “mode of existence” that sense and values express 
and from which they arise.27 In a manner of speaking, this is simply to say that our val-
ues, judgements and sense of things express and derive from our particular being-in-
the-world. However, as opposed to limiting itself to the symptomatology common to 
phenomenological analysis, Nietzschean critique seeks to uncover the ontogenetic force 
that appropriates, exploits, possesses and is expressed in the differential element itself. It 
seeks, in other words, a genealogy of sense.  
In concerning itself with the relation between forces and our being, genealogy invari-
ably relates to Nietzsche’s rethinking of quantity and quality as related to the multiple 
                                                        
25 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy [1962] (2006), 1. 
26 Ibid., 1. 
27 Ibid., 2. 
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and their respective relationship. Deleuze’s basic contention is that for Nietzsche – 
against mechanistic abstractions of unity and numerical quantity – forces can never be 
thought of in isolation nor as equal.28 Psychic forces of interiority (the first fold) are al-
ways in relations of inequality, continual flux and disequilibrium. Such a relation pre-
sents us with a world of “dynamic quanta,” wherein forces clash with one another in 
such a way that one will invariably take the superior position and as such establish and 
subordinate inferior forces.29 It follows that a force must express itself in accordance with 
the other forces to which it relates. Forces do not relate via negationis, and neither are 
their subsequent quality determined via negationis. Or rather, forces do not contradict, 
they ‘vice-dict’ each other, corresponding through domination/submission without los-
ing their singularity. The essence of force, then, is its “quantitative difference from other 
forces, which is expressed as the force’s quality.”30 If a force dominates over another, if it 
is quantitatively superior, it will have for itself the quality of being active: it commands, 
creates, transforms and overcomes. Conversely, an inferior force will have to submit to 
its superior counterpart, and as such it will only have for itself the quality of reaction. 
Quality, in other words, denotes the means by which a force can express itself in a given 
relation of quantity.  
Anomalous though this may seem, the role of the Outside (as in the second fold as 
that which is folded in to create the third fold as continuum) in this process is to be un-
derstood by way of the inside, taken as will or drive. There must be some sort of non-
subjective compulsion assigned to forces to make them what they are, Nietzsche holds, 
for mere variations of power “could not feel themselves to be such: there must be pre-
sent something that wants to grow and interprets the value of whatever else wants to 
grow.”31 As opposed to the anthropomorphic sense as known by psychology, or related-
ly the mechanic sense of a strict causality between cause and effect as known by classical 
physics, this idea of will/drive refers precisely to the differential (as the Outside that dif-
ferentiates forces) and genetic (as that which determines their quality) element of force 
relations. The difference in quantity reflects a differential element of related forces, 
“which is also the genetic element of the qualities of these forces.”32 The relation also 
involves chance according to the asynchronistic movements of history. Chance as arbi-
trary Outside encounters of experience (or ‘haphazard conflicts’ as Foucault puts it) 
bring forces into relation in the first instance, while “the will to power is the determining 
principle of this relation.”33 
The Outside as encounter provides the will to power with its qualities. Qualities such 
as we find in a moral diktat; equal in part to Freud’s reality principle as expressed and 
exercised by the superego against the Id and through which the ego arises as the medi-
                                                        
28 Ibid., 44.  
29 Friedrich W. Nietzsche, The Will to Power [1901] (1968), 339.  
30 Nietzsche and Philosophy, 46. 
31 The Will to Power, 342. 
32 Nietzsche and Philosophy, 46. 
33 Ibid., 49. 
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ated form. Unlike Freud’s superego, however, Deleuze-Nietzsche’s Outside qualities do 
not express an outside force of negation, as with the repression of the sexual Id. Rather, 
these Outside qualities add to and produce the Inside multiplicity/fold by compelling the 
evaluation and relation of forces so as to affect their means of expression or their mode 
of becoming. The Outside here acts as the primordial qualitative element underpinning 
interpretation, and in turn that which determines the qualities of force. Crucially, “these 
fluent, primordial and seminal qualitative elements,” Deleuze warns, “must not be con-
fused with the qualities of force.”34 Whereas the quality of a force is determined by the 
differential of quantities, designated in terms of active and reactive forms of expression, 
the quality of the will to power itself is designated in terms of affirmative and negative. 
With this reading, action and reaction “are more like means, means or instruments of the 
will to power which affirms and denies, just as reactive forces are instruments of nihil-
ism.”35  
The will to power is a differential and a genetic element of psychic force relations of 
the self. Taking their cue from Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition36 – specifically chapter 2 
where the will to power as the differential-genetic is used to conceptualise the third syn-
thesis of time and in turn as a way to revise the Freudian Oedipal process – Deleuze and 
Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus takes up the will to power and applies it to psychoanalytic de-
sire and politics as social-production.37 From this, it holds that the true nature of instincts 
cannot be inferred from their instantiation in social institutions and representations up 
to and including the Oedipal triangle (daddy-mommy-me). Indeed, desire is deemed 
‘machinic’ by Deleuze and Guattari, precisely because it does not represent anything. 
Desire only produces in the real world and its product is reality and our experience of it. 
Desire produces in this vein by virtue of its folded connections with “social production” 
as the immanent Outside. In this way, the production of reality takes the form of an im-
manent causality (the cause is in the effect), in which there is no dualism or opposition 
between man and nature, thus: “Nature=Industry=History.”38 Desiring-production is 
thus “one and the same thing as social production,” and so it is far from a ‘natural mul-
tiplicity’, ‘pre-symbolic libidinal flux’, or predicate of power, as Butler and Grace hold.39 
In short, Deleuzian desire is the will to power.  
Here, the two sides of the will to power (also the first and second folds; the differen-
tial interpretation and evaluation; and the two multiplicities [virtual and actual] as they 
are construed in Difference and Repetition) are construed instead in terms of desiring-
production (micropolitical) and, as already mentioned, social production (macropoliti-
cal). But this distinction does not amount to an ontological dualism, such as the dualism 
                                                        
34 Ibid., 50. 
35 Ibid., 50. 
36 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, chp 2.  
37 To be sure, see Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus [1972] (2004), 355. For more on the relation be-
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between the One and the Many, “but on the contrary, of distinguishing two types of multi-
plicities,” or rather two types of folded production that form a continuum, the third 
fold.40 The microscopic/micropolitical and the macroscopic/macropolitical are of the 
same nature, the ontological plane – Univocal or Oneness of Being – differing only in 
regime as distinct magnitudes of expression from the virtual into the actual, or the 
incompossible into the possible. Many have interpreted the One of immanence in terms 
of Platonist emanation. Deleuze does indeed claim that all modalities and differences, all 
individuals and substances, are expressions of a single ontological substance.41 That is to 
say, there is no difference of category, of substance and of form, between the senses of 
the word ‘Being’, e.g. for-itself and in-itself, or, ultimately, the subject and object. But, and 
this is the crucial point, the single ontological substance relates to itself through a series 
of disjunctive differentials or folds between and within multiplicities as distinguishable 
regimes, and it is only by virtue of this differential that it can create differenciated or 
qualitative distinctions in Being, i.e. beings. The single and same sense is difference in-
itself and thus the expression of the multiple, as opposed to the monotony of the One. 
Thus, the difference in regime, or the difference between the Inside and Outside – which 
can be understood as an epistemological, even ontic difference – does not exclude the im-
manence of each to the other. There are “only multiplicities of multiplicities forming a sin-
gle assemblage, operating in the same assemblage.”42  
The assemblage refers to the relation between multiplicities and as such is broadly 
understood as a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble that synthesises and thus consists 
of divergent divergences, be they biological, social, machinic, gnoseological or imagi-
nary, often underpinned and partly shaped by a broader socio-historical substratum. 
Each assemblage of desire has elements or multiplicities of several kinds, with different 
elements interpenetrating one another. The multiplicity of the multiplicity, the great 
‘third’ fold that connects Inside and Outside, establishes an assemblage as a continuum.  
The principle of syntheses, the great ‘third’ fold of the will to power, is construed here 
through the concept of Body without Organs (BwO). In accordance with its broader defi-
nition as the plane of immanence or the virtual prior to its actualised expression, the 
BwO in this context marks the zero point of virtual intensities or forces. In relating the 
BwO to desire, it is important to distinguish it from Freud’s death instinct.  
The death instinct implies a kind of thermodynamic reference or a process of repeti-
tive compulsion to seek satisfaction from the same object (the obsessional neurotic re-
turn of the same), matching a particular memory trace of previous satisfaction (such as 
nipple-mouth).43 In contrast, the BwO represents an interruption in this process, an anti-
production, wherein the subject is open to a virtual past that contains a limitless variety 
of modes or an incompossibility of modes of satisfaction. By incompossibility, I mean 
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multiple and seemingly contradictory possibilities that virtually co-exist in the self with-
out negating each other, by virtue of disjunction. The libidinal or affective connection is 
never merely a choice between one thing and another, ‘this or that’, ‘either/or’ but a 
momentary choice among a multitude of possibilities, i.e. ‘either…or…or’.44 Thus fol-
lowing Deleuze’s rendering of Nietzsche’s notion of the ‘eternal return’ as the continual 
return of the enigmatic differenciator, neurotic repetition is repetition of difference as 
opposed to identity, afforded by intelligence and institutions functioning with but out-
side instinct.45 Each time the representation of sense-presentations in the form of the ‘I’ 
arises – e.g., I feel angry; I am a sensitive soul; I love tea – one is merely actualising a 
variant, and a new configuration of the incompossible relation of forces as derived from 
the Outside and as found in the spatiotemporal virtual self. Each arrival of the conjunc-
tive ‘I’ is different to the one that preceded it no matter how repetitive the identity-
performance to which the ‘I’ relates. The disjunctive thus serves to break the self into 
multiple subjectivities, as in a fractured I.  
There is another mode of anti-production, however. In this other mode, the BwO is 
subjected to an exclusive disjunction. It is exclusive for it refers to a relation that forces a 
choice between one thing or another. It is here that we find repression. Now, Foucault 
could be forgiven for shying away and bemoaning any use of the concept ‘repression’. 
Though certainly not a unified concept, it can be loosely described as depending on two 
basic postulates: the idea of a unified subject with essential attributes that are then re-
pressed and a central power that does the repressing via outright negation. Deleuze 
clearly avoids reference to a unified subject, seeing instead the subject as perpetually 
and always-already fractured ‘I’, a disjunctive assemblage of force relations. And though 
negation is certainly the intention of numerous repressive powers, Deleuze holds that 
repression never quite functions in that way. Being equivalent to Nietzschean evaluation, 
it refers to the primordial Outside qualities that redirect or reroute the productive flows 
and connections of desire, in turn codifying them into distinct types. Or rather, to re-use 
the language of Deleuze’s Nietzsche from whence this concept derives, it means altering 
the form of expression of forces. Once more, there is no negation in this relation. In redi-
recting the forces of desire, as opposed to negating them outright, repression produces 
new assemblages of desire. That is its critical power, the power to produce modes of 
subjectification.  
The fundamental argument of Anti-Oedipus is that such repression is central to the 
operation of capitalism. It aids capitalism in insulating itself from its own interior limit. 
This limit is the schizo-subject (a subject open to multiple or incompossible modes of 
libidinal connection) that it produces by decoding and deterritorialising. Capitalism re-
leases polyvocal desire by exchanging qualitative or evaluative codes of pre-industrial 
society (good vs. evil) with the abstract quantities of the axiomatic of capital (the value 
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of exchange). And yet, post-industrial consumer societies, Deleuze and Guattari con-
tend, are highly dependent on ‘neurotic’ subjects who, for instance, frivolously consume 
to sustain economic growth, or feel guilt for not paying a debt to sustain creditors, or 
who are ‘stable’ enough to retain confidence in markets and so forth. Thus capitalism 
embarks on a second movement or re-territorialisation, under which it seeks to re-use 
qualitative codes to effectuate the desired subjectivity. Re-territorialisation is primarily 
achieved through the family. For under capitalism, the family is privatised and placed 
outside the social field. Such placing is capitalism’s greatest social fortune, in that it is 
the condition under which the entire social field can be applied to the family. Through 
the family, Oedipal complex is employed as a fiction that separates desire from its pro-
ductive force of connection, thus creating the conditions of the required neuroses (akin 
to the topology of Nietzsche’s ‘internalisation of man’ as conceptualised by Deleuze).46 
The judge, the policeman and the teacher do not represent and re-enact the father. The 
father represents and re-enacts the judge, the policeman and the teacher. The repressive 
process engenders a split at the centre of the subject between his abstract ideal, preceded 
by the potential of the axiomatic, and the codes by which he lives.47  
Modes of repression and disciplinary tactics applied to multiple layers of our inter-
subjective being shape our sense of self on an unconscious level, in turn reifying a per-
vading order (the second fold) or at least establishing what we can perhaps call manage-
able ‘subjects of convenience’. Desire is always-already assembled and directed by socio-
political and economic forms of organisation as its immanent Outside. This notion of 
unconscious desire leaves us with the question of agency-based resistance. The point, for 
Deleuze and Guattari, is that it is precisely by virtue of being the agentic and affective 
pivot point of such forms that desire as will to power has the capability to surmount 
them; and, indeed, to surmount the general categories of standard politics altogether. If 
we are constituted at this virtual affective level (desire), albeit in accordance with the 
actual/macro, then it is to the virtual, first and foremost, that we must seek political sub-
version. 
We can never reach the virtual directly either in action or thought, for all action and 
thought is an actualised expression of the virtual under the form of an extension that 
necessarily cancels out the intensive through which the virtual proceeds into the actual. 
The unconscious, in other words, remains unconscious and can only be accessed and 
affected indirectly. In terms of the indirect, there are certain techniques or tactics that act 
as new Outside encounters. These encounters affect the virtual by altering the force-
relations of the virtual unconscious, thus changing the direction, speed, intensity and 
sensibility of thought. The force relations of the self that continually define and shape 
the ego can be affected and recomposed through our own created encounters. In recom-
posing these forces, one can disrupt all that relies on a specific configuration of them. 
Such tactical folding has the potential to reconfigure and release captured intensities or 
actualise new ones, to transform the subjectivities upon which the socio-political relies.  
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The disjunctive fold – the differenciator, dark precursor or BwO – through which the 
virtual is related to a plane of organisation, creates the very excess through which this 
can be technically realised. For it is by the disjunctive that there are a variety, an incom-
possibility of virtual-desiring virtualities waiting at any given time to be actualised and 
reshaped through various techniques that create new encounters across a range of per-
sonal, social, and political strata. As we will come to see, this strongly resonates with 
Foucault’s own ethics of the care of the self, for it regards techniques and practices that 
opens paths of resistance, without reference to a real or formal transcendence that would 
contradict the immanent ontology upon which this concept of desire is perched. Where 
there is power, there is resistance.  
Foucault, Power-Knowledge and Pleasure 
We find this conceptual schema of ‘pure’ immanence with its three levels of folding in 
Foucault, albeit within the context of the three axes of Foucault’s genealogy: discourse, 
power and ethics; and of course, in a different development order. 
Foucault’s first axis (including works such as The Order of Things and the Archaeology 
of Knowledge) studies discourse as a mode of inquiry that objectifies the speaking subject 
in general grammar, philology, and linguistics. In this sense, it signifies an ontological 
engagement with folded relations exterior to the self, exterior though interiorized con-
structions of linguistic meaning, i.e. the second fold. Indeed, in outlining discursive for-
mations and their inner workings, Foucault dismisses four initial hypotheses on the ba-
sis that, in each case, the ‘logic of dispersion’ undermines the assumption of internal 
consistency. Dispersion, in this instance, is understood as not merely a scattering of ele-
ments in an open space, but ‘a difference within the convergence of heterogeneous do-
mains’.48 With such an understanding, it holds that the concept is inseparable from dis-
junctive syntheses, in which, once more, differences are not collapsed into a unity (as 
with dialectical thinking), but rather form the intersection where linguistically signifia-
ble unities of knowledge can appear. For this reason, Foucault argues that a discursive 
formation is characterised not by privileged objects but by the way it forms objects that 
are in fact highly dispersed or mutually exclusive without having to modify itself. When 
one speaks of a system of formation, “one does not only mean the juxtaposition, coexist-
ence, or interaction of heterogeneous elements….but also the relation that is established 
between them – and in a well determined form – by discursive practice.”49 
Following this analysis of discourse, Foucault was soon to recognise that man is 
“equally placed in power relations that are very complex.”50 While this signifies a shift in 
the form of analysis, the disjunctive logic remains the same, though now it explicitly 
meets force as its Outside. Thus, when Foucault presents an analytic of “power without 
the king,” he is directly referring to, as he puts it himself, a “multiplicity of force rela-
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tions” or “the [virtual] moving substrate of relations between forces, which by virtue of 
their inequality, constantly engender states of power,” such that every relation between 
forces is a power relation.51 In being the virtual double our Outside of discursive 
knowledge, it holds that power shares an intimate connection with it. Whereas force is, 
as Deleuze quite aptly puts it, diagrammatic, in that it is “detached from any specific 
use,” knowledge concerns formed matters or substances and formalised functions, “di-
vided up segment by segment according to the two great formal conditions of seeing 
and speaking, light and language.”52 Knowledge in this way represents a relatively rigid 
segmentarity, as in a segment inscribed on a virtual plane of immanent incompossibility 
that forces it into actualised differentations, i.e. something identifiable and seemingly 
binary, or simply, an exclusive disjunction. The difference in nature between power and 
knowledge, however, does not prevent a mutual immanence or double-conditioning 
within the remit of folded Univocity. As before, they differ only in regime; and we see 
that the one continually affects the other, such that to isolate one as the ultimate cause is 
to enact a radical abstraction. Here, truth is “linked in a circular relation with systems of 
power that produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which 
extend it – a ‘régime’ of truth’.”53 Hence: power-knowledge.  
The echoes here of Nietzsche’s concept of force, as conceptualised by Deleuze, are far 
from coincidental. On numerous occasions we find Foucault directly linking his idea of 
power relations with Nietzsche’s concept of force, or as Foucault puts it in ‘Truth and 
Juridical Forms’, the idea that ‘knowledge will finally appear as the “spark between two 
swords”’; there is no form of “congruence, love, unity, and pacification,” but rather “ha-
tred, struggle, power relations.”54 More significant is Foucault’s acknowledgment of the 
influence of Deleuze’s “superb book about Nietzsche,” and Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-
Oedipus – which, as I argued, relies on Deleuze’s concept of the will to power as devel-
oped in Nietzsche and Philosophy – in the construction of his understanding of power.55 
Deleuze’s Nietzsche thus comes to influence Foucault in two ways. The first is direct, 
and comes by way of Nietzsche and Philosophy. The second is indirect, and comes by way 
of Anti-Oedipus. 
The use of Deleuze in this way is quite haphazard, and is thus deserving of clarifica-
tion. Foucault’s use of disjunction in Archaeology of Knowledge [1969] came ten years after 
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the publication of Deleuze’s Nietzsche and Philosophy [1962]. Though there are no direct 
references to Deleuze’s Nietzsche in Archaeology, Foucault does directly employ a read-
ing of Nietzsche’s genealogy that is strikingly similar. And given Foucault’s comments 
on Nietzsche and Philosophy as per above, we can infer (with some reservation) that Fou-
cault did draw from it. Beyond inference, what is certain is that Nietzsche and Philosophy 
and Anti-Oedipus (1972), alongside the events in France of May 1968,56 provoked Fou-
cault’s conceptual inclusion of power as an Outside force relation; as exemplified in Dis-
cipline and Punish (1975) and the first volume of the History of Sexuality, The Will to 
Truth (1980). Indeed, Foucault directly references Anti-Oedipus as the inspiration for his 
concept of power. 57  
The chronology above relates to a principle difference between Foucault and 
Deleuze’s respective use of Nietzschean force as related to the fold. It regards the type of 
force-relations in question. In Deleuze’s earlier works (the ones published prior to Anti-
Oedipus) the force-relations in question are primarily psychic, or unconscious in the 
Bergsonian vein of a virtual multiplicity— thus signifying the first fold. Though still vir-
tual, in that it refers to a real relation without an actual extended existence, Foucault’s 
use of force in his early to middle works concerns the socio-political and exterior— thus 
signifying the second fold. That is, where Deleuze’s oeuvre starts out with an analysis of 
what I have identified as the first fold, Foucault’s oeuvre begins and develops up to his 
middle period the second fold and the folded relations therein. Specifically, the second 
fold is developed in terms of discursive knowledge and its relation to power. 
Though the first fold remains somewhat absent in Foucault’s early to middle works, 
we find in them a conceptual incorporation that bears on the third; I say ‘although’, for 
the third fold is the connection between the first and second, and thus presupposes the 
existence of both. First, the third fold exists as a principle underpinning the relation be-
tween knowledge and power, in terms of double-conditioning. Second, the third fold is 
developed in Foucault’s discussion of power in Will to Truth. Specifically, regarding the 
question of macro-political strategy. Here, Foucault argues that though power-relations 
are not static forms of distribution, they eventually enter into and correspond to an over-
all strategy, such as bio-power, simultaneously gaining support “from precise and tenu-
ous relations serving, not as its point of application or final outcome, but as its prop and 
anchor point.”58 As with power-knowledge, we are presented with ‘double-
conditioning’ though now in a context acutely akin to Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of 
the assemblage as a casually immanent relation, i.e. the relation between the microscopic 
and macroscopic, wherein the two domains reinforce and undermine each other via a 
relation of disjunction. Foucault tries to capture this entire process through the concept 
of the dispositif, as “a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, insti-
tutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scien-
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tific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions,” and so forth.59 It 
is the system of relations that can be established between these elements, as with the 
assemblage. The two concepts are, for the most part, interchangeable.  
Now, this raises the question of the difference between the exterior and the Outside. 
The exterior refers to that which sits outside of the self as an interior. Though the Out-
side refers to that which is immanently Outside the self, it also refers to that which is 
immanently Outside of any relation, subjective or otherwise. Discourse has its own Out-
side understood as force or power-relations, though that does not render discourse as 
the interior self. Thus when I speak of an Inside self, the ‘Insideness’ is not a concept 
exclusive to the self, whereas its interiority is. Discourse and power are still, at this point 
of Foucault’s thinking, primarily of the exterior. The interior self of the first fold finally 
appears in Foucault’s last works, which he self-classified as a turn to ethics / third axis of 
genealogy. The self takes centre-stage.  
Given the role of disjunction, it is unsurprising to see that resistance, as with Deleuze, 
concerns an ethical practice of the self that can take advantage of the dispersion or dis-
junctive excess underpinning a dispositif. This notion of resistance relates to Foucault’s 
initial construction of ethics as the third axis of genealogy by which the individual con-
stitutes and recognises him/herself as a subject (self-subjection), in particular a subject of 
sexuality, “how men have learned to recognize themselves as subjects of ‘sexuality’.”60 
Such a formation speaks to a retroactive consumption of the very discursive identities 
and norms produced and thrown up by virtual processes of force relations in conjunc-
tion with strategies of bio-power. In order for the recognition or identification with a 
subject position to remain somewhat stable, or at least to take effect, it requires practices 
of the self that serve to reinforce it, such that ethics involves “technologies of the self.”61 
Thus, when, in The Subject and Power, Foucault declares that “it is not power, but the 
subject, that is the general theme of my research,” he is in fact referring to the immanent 
double-conditioning process by which the subject and the identities by which it attempts 
to sustain itself are generated.62 There is no privileged subject as the pre-condition of 
thought, meaning and action, but rather a subject as an immanent effect. But given that 
it is an effect of a process of immanent disjunction, which as we saw speaks to a fallible 
unity of incompossible elements that are related without being subsumed (in which any 
variant of this relation can be actualised at any point in time) it follows that a certain 
excess is built into the relation. It is an excess that propels and allows for the self-
overcoming of the condition, turning it into a process. Taking advantage of this excess 
through technologies of the self is equivalent to refolding. Ethical practice, then, can be 
turned around/ refolded so as to subvert a self-identified subject position, a new interior 
folding.  
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In exploring this, Foucault turns to the classical Greeks as, for him, they present the 
beguiling idea of life as material for a work of art. As Foucault puts it, the ethical sub-
stance in ancient Greece – aphrodisia – is a nexus of forces that links together rules, 
techniques and institutions, along with “acts, pleasures, and desires,” operating ‘”be-
neath the codes and rules” of knowledge and power, unfolding and merging with them, 
creating new foldings (and being created in the process), whose “variations constitute 
irreducible modes of subjectivation.”63 The object for moral reflection is not the act itself, 
or desire, or even pleasure, but “more the dynamics that joined all three in a circular 
fashion.”64 In this sense, the ancient Greeks “folded force,” they “made it relate back to 
itself,” and far from ignoring interiority, individuality or subjectivity, “they invented the 
subject, but only as a derivative rule of free men,” as Deleuze puts it.65  
But does this interiority as Inside fold have substantial affectivity as it does in 
Deleuze? Is it not the case that where Foucault politicises the fold (that is the disper-
sion/disjunction at the heart of a discursive formation) through the addition of force, 
which speaks to a topological relationship in which the Inside-interiority is formed by a 
crease in the Outside, Deleuze makes desire the inside in general, or “the mobile connec-
tion between the inside and the two other features, the outside and strata?”66 Foucault 
does not completely neglect the body, or indeed the affective as related to the body. In-
deed, in the Will to Truth, Foucault goes on to identify two routes down which the pow-
er over life proceeded: the first “anatomic” and the second “biological.”67 However as is 
oft-commented, Foucault does not explore the interiority of the affective body as a virtu-
al multiplicity of force relations in and of itself.  
Regarding affective interiority, this came later in the final stage of Foucault’s thought. 
In the first volume of The History of Sexuality – which I would argue is the pivot point 
between the second and third axis68 – Foucault speaks of a “sensualization of power and 
a gain of pleasure,” in which the pleasure discovered feeds back to the power that encir-
cled it.69 There is a certain “pleasure that comes of exercising a power that questions, 
monitors, watches, spies, searches out, palpates, brings to light.”70 He also speaks of a 
“pleasure that kindles at having to evade this power, flee from it, fool it, or travesty 
it….power asserting itself in the pleasure of showing off, scandalizing, or resisting.”71 
Thus, even though power captures pleasure, and finds pleasure in its capturing, pleas-
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ure also offers the ‘possibility of resistance’, which is to say that there are ‘perpetual spi-
rals of power and pleasure’. The notion of spirals of power and pleasure offers an affective 
and agentic site that need not refer to an essentialist factor sitting outside of the imma-
nent process of subjectivity.72 Pleasure, in other words, has its reactive and active mo-
ments; when of the former, it is the most effective method of re-folding— acts of pleas-
ure over analyses of desire.  
Politico-Ethical (Re)Considerations   
I have thus far traced three prominent lines of convergence between Deleuze and Fou-
cault:  
Disjunctive (folding of) syntheses, in which differences – and the Outside and Inside 
– are related without for all that being collapsed into a higher unity or dissolving into 
separate ontological orders. In Deleuze, this is understood interchangeably in terms of 
quantitative and qualitative forces; micro and macro multiplicities/politics; desiring- and 
social-production; and the assemblage. In Foucault, this is understood interchangeably 
in terms of discursive dispersion; power as the virtual substrate of force relations; dou-
ble-conditioning of the micro/macro; and the dispositif.  
Political resistance as an ethics of the self or ethical practice, wherein one takes ad-
vantage of the dispersion or excess that results from disjunction, refolding or folding back, 
such that resistance need not refer to either a real (positive Body) or formal (negativity) 
transcendence that would negate immanence. In Deleuze this is understood in terms of 
becoming a Body without Organs. In Foucault, this is understood in terms of a care of the 
self.  
The use of the body and affectivity as the inside of the fold or power. In Deleuze this 
is understood in terms of desire. In Foucault this is understood in terms of pleasure. 
Recognising the convergence is incredibly noteworthy, for it undermines those who 
interpret the immediate lines of divergence between Deleuze and Foucault as occurring 
in the understanding of subjectivity and (its relation to) power. The former is alleged of 
committing to a mechanistic negative conception of power with a positive subject as its 
correlate that stands opposed to the latter’s positive relational conception of power— or 
vice versa depending on the interpretation. The ontological consistency in turn leads to a 
workable consistency regarding the question of affectivity and politico-ethical re-
sistance. Disjunctive syntheses of force-relations (power) contain an excess as opportune 
discontinuities. As this synthetic concept is at the centre of the power/interior-affective 
network itself – it is how it functions – it follows that resistance is built into. It is through 
the excess that one may ‘refold’.   
There remains, however, the question of ethical differentiation. The question is highly 
heuristic in that it bears on the critical ontic difference between pleasure and desire and 
their respective efficacy. From genealogy – be that Deleuzian or Foucauldian – it follows 
that there is no objective, ‘higher’ analogical vantage point/no transcendent Outside to 
which we can refer and no stable vantage point of thought = no morality with a univer-
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sal ontological or epistemic basis. What then? To remain consistent Deleuze and Fou-
cault once again follow Nietzsche’s genealogy, and to some extent Spinoza’s Ethics (the 
two are sewn together in a way that makes for a partly indiscernible union). Nietzsche 
and Spinoza both overturn moral questions that imply essence via potentiality and in 
reference to external primary analogates (i.e. what should I do?) in favour of ethical ones. 
The ethical concerns a reference to Being in terms of existence and its capability and the 
power of effectuation (i.e. what can I do?). That is, the consistency between Univocal 
immanence and ethics so conceived is found in the fact that such ethical questions are 
grounded in the immanent modes of existence themselves, with reference to the degree of 
power, the processes of actualisation, subjectification and stratification, i.e., what mode 
of existence does a particular thought, action or feeling imply? From where does it de-
rive and what does it express? How is a mode determined? Modes of existence or ex-
pressions of the virtual, in other words, should be evaluated according to the intensive 
criteria of power in its qualitative and typological senses. Affective expression is evalu-
ated according to its determining will to power or type of pleasure, in terms of active 
and reactive wills to power (and capacities), with one ultimately affirming life in its dif-
ference of creative becoming and the other negating it.  
Deleuze and Foucault differ in terms of preferred language for conceptualising this 
affective-virtual multiplicity. Foucault opts for ‘pleasure’ for it avoids psychoanalytic 
idealism and the myth that there is a desire free from power. Pleasure is, for Foucault, a 
question of quantity, whereas desire is a question of quality. Either we are concerned 
with merely differentiating expressed modes corresponding to actions based on efficacy 
and sustenance (the ‘too much’ and ‘too little’ of pleasure), or we are concerned with 
moralising an action by qualifying its object of interest through recourse to a subjective 
determining drive (the ‘pure’ kind and the ‘perverted’ kind of desire) as that which re-
veals the truth and value of the self. Even when recognising that Deleuze and Guattari 
employ a concept of desire distinct from psychanalytic idealism that treats desire as a 
permanent a priori form subject to permanent a priori judgements, Foucault remains 
sceptical. The word itself is what appears to be problematic. Language exists in a discur-
sive network after all, particularly conceptual language. Thus, despite any internal con-
ceptual subversions, the use of a word entails a subtle network of power-relations capa-
ble of invoking and/or inviting un/intended misuses. As Foucault puts it: 
Deleuze and Guattari obviously use the notion in a completely different way. But the 
problem I have is that I’m not sure if, through this very word, despite its different 
meaning, we don’t run the risk, despite Deleuze and Guattari’s intention, of allowing 
some of the medico-psychological presuppositions [prises] that were built into desire, 
in its traditional sense, to be reintroduced.73 
Deleuze agrees that desire and power are synonymous in that they are mutually consti-
tuted in a discursive domain that entails a power-knowledge network. However, 
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Deleuze goes on to say that pleasure too is problematic, especially as a resistive concept. 
It is less a discursive concern, as more a topological one. Pleasure can signal an effect or 
be secondary to a process in which desire is already assembled. Pleasure, Deleuze con-
tends, “seems to me to be the only means for a person or a subject to orientate them-
selves in a process that exceeds them. It is a re-territorialisation. From my point of view, 
this is precisely how desire is brought under the law of lack and with the norm of pleas-
ure,” and thus pleasure sits “on the side of strata and organization…it is in the same 
breath that desire is presented as internally submitting to the law and outwardly regu-
lated by pleasures.”74 The critical point is that a reactively assembled desire can find a 
sort of pleasure in its own repression or in the punishment of others by way ressentiment. 
Thus pleasure is not inherently subversive or free from discursive restraint.  
Two points should be made here. First, it is plausible that Deleuze’s subverted use of 
desire is one that is possible and exists by virtue of the very disjunctive excesses of the a-
signifying chain underpinning discourse. That is, the subverted use of the concept itself 
is a prime instance of Foucauldian resistance through discursive power relations. Se-
cond, Deleuze’s critique of pleasure downplays the ‘active’ and ‘reactive’ distinction 
Foucault makes in it. Though seemingly qualitative, active and reactive pleasures refer 
to the quantity of the pleasurable activity itself and how that relates to various modes of 
being. Like Deleuzian desire, it stands that pleasure in repression can be a ‘reactive’ 
pleasure; that an active or affirmative pleasure is congruent with an active and affirma-
tive ‘Deleuzian’ desire. What is the true ontological difference, after all, between desire 
and pleasure as affective insides of power? And so, what are Deleuze and Foucault if not 
vrais amis?  
But these are strictly suggestive remarks, the potential of which warrants a vast con-
ceptual effort to realise and judge; this is the reservatio finalis. There is no obvious or im-
mediate resolution to this ontic disagreement beyond the plausible. But given the onto-
logical affinity between Deleuze and Foucault, this difference and the mutual critique it 
entails can no longer be couched in terms familiar to the literature thus far. Future dis-
cussions and debates should start from the acknowledgement that ‘desire’ in Deleuze 
and ‘pleasure’ in Foucault are short hands for an affective inside to an immanent and 
relational understanding of subjectificating powers, the conceptualisation of which is 
indebted to Nietzsche; and that both concepts remain problematic. It is only by explicat-
ing the true lines of convergence between Deleuze and Foucault that we can open a 
clearer discussion vis-à-vis pleasure and desire. Ultimately, we should dismiss the idea 
that Deleuze and Foucault cannot be mutually engaged when considering ethico-
political and agentic/affective questions. 
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